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ABSTRACT 
 In this paper, we base our policy analyses and simulations on three different specifications of 
a DSGE model developed for a CIS oil rich country and check the impact of the oil windfalls. 
The first proposed specification is a classical one with a Taylor rule and the second one is a 
recently new specification with a money growth rule. Beside two familiar specifications, we 
propose a new specification which assumes a temporary money market disequilibrium in the 
short run. This disequilibrium is a result of the fiscal misbalance and (non-primary) pro-deficit 
policy pursued by the fiscal authority. We show that all three specifications allow the fiscal 
authority to act as the main actor in propagating and amplifying the effects of the oil price shocks 
to the rest of the economy. When an oil shock hits the economy, its first round effect operates 
through oil fund transfers to the budget. The second round effects result from an increase in 
government consumption and government investment expenditures, which augments public 
capital affecting total factor productivity (TFP) and production, as well as the aggregate demand. 
We also find that despite significant differences, all three specifications demonstrate similar 
response dynamics. 
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1. Introduction 
The first decade of the new century has seen a rising interest in DSGE models both in academia 
and at the central banks over the world. Central banks focused on developing DSGE models for 
carrying out daily routine tasks, especially in forecasting and policy analysis. They were 
considered not only new modeling tools allowing for the diversification of the existing "model 
suite", but also avoiding the methodological concerns regarding the use of less structural general 
equilibrium models at their disposal. 
Now, although DSGE models become standard tools for quantitative analysis, they are generally 
developed for advanced economies. In those models, a central bank is assumed to maintain a 
flexible exchange regime and determines interest rate using the famous Taylor-rule. In these 
specifications, foreign exchange market is not explicitly modeled and the UIP assumption is 
imposed (see, for instance, Kollmann (1997), Clarida, et al (1999), Erceg, et al (2000), Smets 
and Wouters (2002), Gali and Gertler (2007), Christoffel, et al (2008)). Though this classical 
specification might be relevant in the case of advanced economies, it is generally overlooking 
important economic dynamics of emerging markets, especially oil rich countries. 
Almost all the resource abundant countries maintain a hard peg or more similar regimes and 
frequently intervene to the exchange market to ensure the stability of the officially determined 
exchange rate. These interventions lead to significant fluctuations and excess volatility in the 
money supply. Most occasionally, the monetary authority loses control of the money supply and 
the fiscal dominance becomes an inevitable economic reality. 
However, although those characteristics are important and distinct for oil rich countries, they are 
generally ignored or not explicitly specified in the classical models. Therefore, it might be 
interesting to check the potential value-added of explicitly capturing those features in a model.    
In this paper, we develop three specifications, including classical specifications with Taylor rule 
and fixed exchange regime. In all specifications, fiscal sector driven economic growth is 
captured by the detailed description of the fiscal authority and its spending rules. The revenues 
from the sales of the oil in the international markets accrue to the state oil fund which transfers a 
certain amount of its resources to the state budget. Because large portion of the budget 
expenditures is channeled into public investment projects, we also introduce public capital 
through TFP into the model. Those specifications allow us to test various fiscal rules which 
determine the pace of the spending of oil revenues. 
In all three specifications, the government imposes income taxes and borrows from public based 
on a fiscal rule (see, for example, Berg et al (2010), Dagher et al (2010)). Here, an oil price 
shock affects the economy through its effect on the fiscal sector, pushing up the fiscal spending. 
This differs from the mechanism describing how an oil price shock operates in an economy as 
provided in Medina and Soto (2006). There, the government budget is closed by lump-sum taxes 
and the oil price shock affects the economy by relaxing the budget constraint of the household 
sector due to the reduction in lump-sum taxes.  
Although FX market is ignored in our first specification, the second and the third specifications 
remove those shortcomings of the classical models by explicitly introducing FX markets, central 
bank interventions and market absorption capacities. In the second specification, the monetary 
authority is assumed to be following an exchange rate rule and intervenes to the FX market to 
ensure the stability of the peg regime. The central bank is also assumed to exercise some degree 
of power in controlling money supply by using its monetary instruments, such as reserve 
requirements, open market operations, etc. 
In the third specification, we assume that the money market is out of equilibrium in the short run, 
but attains equilibrium in the long run. The money market disequilibrium is a consequence of a 
fiscal misbalance policy pursued by the fiscal authority. That is, because a non-primary (non-oil) 
fiscal deficit creates an excess demand, it leads to a disequilibrium in the money market, 
producing an excess supply of money in the short run.  
A government fiscal deficit as a cause of an excessive monetary expansion and loss of control of 
money supply is one of the most frequently encountered topics in any stabilization program 
literature. For example, Khan and Knight (1981) as well as Ozdemir and Turner (2008) claim 
that an excess monetary expansion caused by high budget deficits or excessive credit expansion 
is a source of high aggregate demand and disequilibrium in the market.  
Finally, in the last specification, we assume that this disequilibrium in the money market is 
cleared through three channels -  price channel, real income channel and foreign asset channel.  
In the benchmark model, we conduct experiments and compare the performance of three 
different specifications using impulse-response analysis. We also test the performance of those 
specifications under different fiscal spending rules and monetary policy (flexible exchange 
regime) scenarios. The model results show that all three specifications capture the main 
economic dynamics in the presence of fiscal authority as the main distributor of the income from 
the oil wealth. The other interesting finding is that despite significant differences all three 
specifications demonstrate similar response dynamics. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II develops a theoretical model to 
carry out different policy experiments, Section III explains the logic behind the choice of the 
calibrated parameters, Section IV conducts different policy scenarios and simulations and 
Section V concludes.  
 
 
2. Theoretical Model 
Household sector 
The economy is inhabited by a representative household who allocates its income among 
consumption and investment goods and makes decision on the holdings of domestic currency as 
well as government bonds (foreign bonds) in every period. It supplies homogenous labor to the 
firms and earns rents from supplying necessary capital to the production sector. In addition, it 
earns dividends from the firms as a shareholder and pays taxes. 
The household receives utility from consumption and holding money in domestic currency but 
disutility from working. Its lifetime utility function takes the following form: 
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where tE  denotes expectation term, β  is a discount factor, tC expresses aggregate consumption 
bundle, tl  indicates labor supply, tM  shows domestic currency stock, respectively. tP  indicates 
the overall price level determined in the economy.  
The consumption bundle tC  and tI  are produced according to the CES technology using both 
domestic and foreign goods. The functions take the following specific form: 
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Hence, optimization of the consumption and investment expenditures among domestic and 
foreign goods produce demand for domestic and foreign goods as well as overall price level 
prevailing in the economy: 
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The household expenditure is dictated by the overall budget constraint which is provided below: 
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where tI indicates investment expenditures, tB denotes government bonds held by public, tR  the 
nominal return on holding the bond for one period, tK is the capital stock rent to the production 
sector, tKR ,  is the nominal return paid to the household due to the ownership of the capital, tW  
shows the nominal wage rate, tHD , is the dividends and Wτ  is the income tax imposed on the 
household and te  denotes the domestic price of per unit foreign currency. 
Following Christoffel, et al (2008), it is assumed that the household faces external financial 
intermediation premium ),(
*
**
RP
tBB t
e εΓ  which depends on the net holdings of internationally 
traded foreign bonds expressed in national currency relative to the domestic nominal output, 
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Under this specification households do not hold foreign bonds and economy's net foreign asset 
position is zero at the steady state. The incurred intermediation premium is rebated in lump-sum 
manner, indicated by tΞ .  
The physical capital depreciates at a rate of δ every period and accumulates according to the 
well-known law of motion given below: 
ttt IKK +−= −1)1( δ  
The household maximizes the discounted value of its lifetime utility function subject to the 
budget constraint and capital accumulation equation. Denoting the Lagrange multipliers by 
tt PΛ and taking the derivative with respect to tC , tK , tM , tl  and tB  (
*
tB ) we obtain the 
following FOCs: 
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Production Sector 
There are two sectors in the economy – oil and non-oil sector. It is assumed that the oil sector is 
totally an extraction sector where the production does not require any input. The non-oil sector is 
composed of intermediate and final goods producers. 
 
Intermediate goods producers 
There are continuum of intermediate goods producers in a monopolistically competitive market 
and each produces a differentiated product jtyn  where [ ]0,1j∈ . The intermediate firm j produces 
an output by renting capital and hiring labor using the Cobb-Douglas technology defined below: 
( ) ( ) αα −−= 11 jtjttjt lKAyn    
where tA  denotes public capital augmented technology whose law of motion is as follows: 
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where [ ]1,0∈χ  is a scaling factor, tGK ,  denotes public capital, tA,ε is a technology shock and 
variables with bar represents the steady state values of the respective variables. In the case of 
0=χ the technology shock evolves according to the AR(1) process as in the classical case. This 
specification allows capturing the fact that though a high government spending raises overall 
demand, its effect on the production side is limited. That is, the public capital does not lead to 
adequate increase in the production due to various reasons, for example, inefficiencies in the 
economy or investment on low return projects, etc. 
When a firm sets a price ,
j
H tP  for its products, it faces a quadratic adjustment 
j
tAC cost defined 
below: 
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Thus, a producer maximizes the expected value of the discounted value of its profits subject to 
the demand and production technology constraints. The producer profit (dividend) is determined 
after rent, wage and adjustment cost deductions from its revenue. Hence, a producer problem is 
the maximization of the following expression: 
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The final constraint expresses the demand for the output of the firm j by a final goods producer. 
Defining the Lagrange multiplier of the production technology by jtMC (nominal marginal cost) 
and substituting dividend and demand equations in the objective function and taking the 
derivative with respect to jtK  an 
j
tl  the following FOCs are obtained: 
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Because all firms face the same problem, the pricing decision ( ,jH tP ) in a symmetric equilibrium 
will take the following form: 
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Final goods producers    
In addition, the heterogeneous domestic goods are assembled by intermediate goods producers 
into private consumption and investment as well as government consumption bundles using the 
CES production technology: 
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Therefore, from the optimal use of inputs, the following demand functions are obtained: 
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Oil Sector, Oil Fund and External Sector 
The production in the oil sector is fully an exogenous process and does not require any inputs. 
Because of the small open economy assumption, the demand for oil products oty  as well as oil 
prices ,*otp  is dictated by the international markets. The all extracted oil resources are fully 
exported to the international markets and sold outside. The revenues in the national currency 
tOR  obtained from the oil export are partly used to close the non-oil deficit of the state budget 
and the rest accrues at the State Oil Fund. Therefore, the following equations describe the oil 
production: 
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The oil fund resources *tOF are managed in USD and earn 
*
tR  every period. Certain amount of 
Fund resources ( tFuT ) is transferred to the government budget to close the non-oil deficit. 
Hence, the Oil Fund’s resources accumulate according to the following law of motion: 
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Oil products dominate the composition of the export of the country. Therefore, it is assumed that 
the country only exports oil products and non-oil export sector is relatively small. In addition, 
import tIM  to the country is determined as below: 
tFtFt ICIM ,, +=  
 
Government Sector 
Government collects taxes from households and issues bonds to finance its fiscal expenditures    
( tG ). In addition, every period a part of oil revenues is transferred from the Oil Fund to close the 
non-oil fiscal deficit. Government also holds deposits, tGD , , at the Central Bank and collects 
income taxes from households. Therefore, the budget constraint of the government is as follows: 
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We assume that over the period the government holds the level of borrowing from the public 
constant. Government spending on public investment is composed of two parts (i) the first part 
reflects the fact that in every period government spends a constant share of its expenditure on 
investment (ii) the second part reflects the temporary increase in oil revenues transferred from 
the Fund to the government budget. The dynamics of the public investment and the public capital 
are provided below: 
( )GGGI tOilGtG −+= ωω,  
( ) tGtGtG IKK ,1,, 1 νδ +−= −  
where [ ]1,0∈ν  measures the efficiency of the public investment. 
In every period, the Fund transfers either (i) all revenues from oil sales in the international 
markets to the budget or (ii) according to the fiscal rule described below. This rule reflects 
government’s commitment to PIH (Permanent Income Hypothesis) and the shock tFT ,ε  is 
included to allow for the deviation from PIH. Note that this PIH rule is restrictive and states that 
in every period government spends a constant share of the real oil revenues with respect to the 
non-oil GDP: 
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The accumulation of the net government deposit at the Central Bank is described in the 
following rule which takes into account increase in oil revenues: 
( ) ( )( )FuTFuTDDD tGDGtGDGtG −−+−+= − ιρρ 111,,  
where GD  is the steady state level of the government deposits and the policy parameter [ ]1,0∈ι  
reflects the pace of government spending due to rise in oil revenues. 
 
Monetary Authority 
Monetary authority is modeled using three different specifications (i) classical Taylor and fixed 
exchange rule (ii) monetary growth rule in the spirit of Taylor rule (iii) short-run money market 
disequilibrium specification. 
In the classical specification of the monetary authority, the model is closed using Taylor rule and 
uncovered interest rate parity condition (UIP). However, in the next two specifications the UIP 
assumption is dropped and instead, a simple exchange rate rule will be introduced. Hence, the 
monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate according to the following rule: 
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In a fixed exchange regime under classical specification, the monetary authority keeps the 
depreciation of the national currency constant: 
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In the second specification where monetary authority follows a monetary growth rule, it is 
assumed that the monetary authority sets the exchange rate using a simple rule and intervenes to 
the foreign exchange (FX) market to absorb excess supply or demand of foreign currency. 
The change in money supply can be written as the sum of changes of the net foreign assets 
(NFA) and of the net domestic credits to the economy (DC). It is assumed that the changes in 
NFA results only from monetary authority’s intervention to the FX market. The changes in net 
domestic credit may come from two sources: changes in the net claims on government and 
changes in the net claims on banks and the rest. Therefore, the changes in the money supply can 
be defined as the changes in NFA, changes in the net claims on government and growth in the 
money supply net of NFA and government deposits and can be written as follows: 
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Here, tµ reflects the monetary authority’s ability to control money growth net of NFA and 
government deposits. The growth rule followed by the monetary authority is a Taylor type rule 
and stresses the authority’s ability to control money growth using certain mix of monetary 
instruments under its discretion: 
tttYtt ny ,1 ˆ)ˆˆ)(1(ˆˆ µµµ επηηρµρµ +−−−+= Π−  
As mentioned above, NFA changes due to monetary authority’s intervention to the FX market in 
order to absorb excess supply or demand of foreign currency. Monetary authority’s intervention 
to the FX market depends on the market’s absorption capacity which partly depends on the 
persistence of the process: 
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Note that in the case of FXρ , ORυ , Mυ all equal to zero, tFXMA ,  is constant and monetary 
authority sells or purchases fixed proportion of foreign currency supply to the FX market.   
Hence, the monetary authority’s intervention which determines the changes in NFA can be 
defined as follows: 
( ) tFXttFttt MAIMPFuTNFANFA ,,1 −−=− −  
To close the model, we assume that the monetary authority follows the simple rule to set the 
exchange rate: 
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Note that the case eρ and ξ  equal zero characterizes fixed exchange rate regime and eρ  shows 
the degree of monetary authority's commitment to the fixed exchange regime. 
The third specification differs from the second one in some aspects though most part of the 
second specification is retained throughout the model. The change is in the specification of the 
money supply equation and the money growth rule is also dropped from the model. Thus, the 
money supply equation takes the following familiar form: 
( ) ( )1,,11 −−− −+−=− tGtGtttt DDNFANFAMM  
It is also assumed that there is always a short-term disequilibrium in the money market which 
prevents real money demand to adjust fully to the changes in the real money supply in the short 
run. This disequilibrium is a result of the fiscal misbalance policy pursued by the government. 
The fiscal misbalance emerges in the government sector as a consequence of a non-primary 
budget deficit, financed and sustained by the oil fund transfers. In other words, the non-primary 
(non-oil) fiscal deficit leads to the disequilibrium of the money market in the short run. However, 
in the long run we assume that all markets clear and money market disequilibrium disappears. 
Because of the Walras Law which ensures that the excess market demands of all sectors must 
sum to zero, we make a minor change to the budget constraint of the fiscal sector to account for 
the disequilibrium in the money market. Through this change, the non-primary fiscal deficit 
(excess demand) is linked to the excess (supply) money in the budget constraint of the fiscal 
sector. Overall, all these impositions ensure that the increase in the non-oil fiscal deficit or 
difference in the money gaps across periods are made possible only through rise in the oil fund 
transfers. 
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This disequilibrium in the money market can be eliminated through three potential channels. The 
first one is the price adjustment channel where opposite movements in the price level helps to 
restore equilibrium in the money market. The second channel is the real income channel which 
operates through money demand equation. A rise in the real income of economic agents 
increases their demand on real money balances which helps to absorb excess money supply. The 
third channel operates through FX market where people buy and sell foreign assets which helps 
to bring excess supply of nominal money balances down. That is, when Central Bank builds up 
its foreign reserves by intervening and buying excess supply of foreign currency in the FX 
market, in the absence of sufficient sterilization instruments this intervention further rises excess 
money supply and moves money market away from the equilibrium. Therefore, money 
disequilibrium gap evolves according to the law of motion defined below: 
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deviation of those variables from their respective steady state values.  
Market Clearing 
For the markets clear, the demand and supply in different markets must be matched.  
Capital and Labor Markets 
Capital and labor are supplied by the household whereas demand for those factors of production 
comes from the intermediate firms. The market clearing conditions are as follows: 
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Goods Market 
The intermediate goods is used to produce consumption, investment and government goods. 
Therefore,  
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In nominal terms, 
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Because the production in the economy takes place oil and non-oil sector, the overall nominal 
production tY  is given in the following expression: 
tttHt ORynPY += ,  
Using the equations for nominal consumption, investment expenditures and import, 
tFtFtHtHtt CPCPCP ,,,, +=  
tFtFtHtHtt IPIPIP ,,,, +=  
and replacing them in the resource constraint, the overall production is determined as below: 
tttFttHttttttH ACIMPGPIPCPynP +−++= ,,,  
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Government Domestic Bond Market 
The equilibrium level of domestic government bonds evolve according to the government fiscal 
budget constraint. Because we assume that the government holds the level of the borrowing from 
the public constant, the government bonds evolve according to the following constraint: 
constBB tt == −1  
 
Foreign Bonds Market, Net Foreign Assets and Trade Balance 
The supply of internationally traded bonds is perfectly elastic and matches the holdings of 
foreign bonds by the domestic representative household.  
Because three different specifications are assumed in the model, the evolution of the economy-
wide net foreign assets is different. In the first specification, the net foreign assets evolves 
according to 
t
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In the remaining two specifications, it is assumed that the domestic household does not  hold 
foreign bonds. 
Because the country only exports oil but imports foreign goods from abroad, the overall and non-
oil trade balances can be defined as follows respectively: 
ttFtt IMPORTB ,−=  
ttF
no
t IMPTB ,−=  
 
3. Calibration 
For some of the parameters employed in our calibration exercise, we depend on Azeri data and 
for some others we borrow from the existing literature. Certain parameters of the model are 
taken from the previous microeconomic researches and some are obtained from less structural 
macro-econometric models developed for the country. The steady-state ratios are calculated 
using the available time series from national income accounts and analytical balance of the 
CBAR and the rest of the parameters are borrowed from the related literature. 
The values of subjective discount factor β  and the share of money services )1( MM κγ − are 
obtained from Huseynov and Ahmadov (2012). In their work, the quarterly subjective discount 
factor and the share of money services are estimated to be 0.99 and 0.01 respectively. Using the 
money demand elasticity estimates Mκ1 from the previous empirical works whose magnitude 
was estimated to be around 0.1, the Mγ  is calculated as 0.09.  
 
Table 1. Calibrated Parameters 
Parameters Values Source/Method 
β  0.99 Based on Huseynov and Ahmadov (2012) 
Mγ  0.09 Based on Huseynov and Ahmadov (2012) 
*Bγ  0.01 Taken from literature 
Mκ  10.0 Based on previous estimates 
Cσ , Lτ  1.0 Taken from literature 
ψ  4.7 Calculated using steady-state solution of the model 
Wτ  0.14 Income tax rate for the first income bracket 
Cγ , Iγ  0.5 Calculated using consumption basket 
Cµ , Iµ  0.23; 0.12 Calculated using data on imported goods 
α  0.35 Calculated using data from input-output table 
θ  6.0 Based on survey evidence 
ϕ  59.0 Standard value in literature 
χ  0.1 Based on data  
Gω , Oilω ν ,ι  0.41; 0.11; 0.1; 0.25 Calculated using respective database 
 
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution Cσ  and wage elasticity Lτ are calibrated  to be one in 
magnitude. The steady state value of labor L  is set to 0.33 to satisfy the assumption that a 
representative household spends approximately one third of its time for her job. Using the steady 
state solution of the model, the share of leisure in the utility function of the household is 
calculated as 3.6. To be consistent with the tax rate for the first income bracket in the country (up 
to 2500 AZN, monthly salary), the income tax rate Wτ  is set to 0.14 and can be considered a 
representative tax rate for the most of the employees. 
The previous empirical studies show that the share of home goods ( Cγ  and Iγ ) in the 
composition of consumption basket of households is around 50%, and the demand elasticity of 
imported consumption and investment goods are estimated to be 0.23 and 0.12 using the detailed 
data on the imported products.  
The depreciation rate of both public and private capital is assumed to be the same and is set to 
0.025 on quarterly basis which ensures 10% depreciation annually. 
Using aggregate data on production, the share of capital α  in the Cobb-Douglas production 
function is calculated as 0.35, asserting that the labor costs comprises 65% of production. To 
ensure the condition that a monopolistic firm charges 20% markup over its marginal cost, the 
value of θ  is set to 6.0 for all firms. With above calibrated values for β  and θ  we set the value 
of the nominal adjustment cost parameter ϕ to 59.0, suggesting that the prices remain sticky for 
4-5 quarters. 
We set the value of the scaling factor χ in the augmented TFP equation  to 0.1, to reflect the fact 
that public investments generally carried out at lower efficiency.          
 
Table 2. Calibration of shocks 
Stochastic driving processes of 
shocks Std. dev j
ρ for ]4,0[∈j  
Productivity Aε  0.058  
Foreign interest rate RFε  0.001 1.29; -0.45; 0.0; 0.0 
Foreign inflation *Pε  0.0039 0.13; 0.0; 0.0; 0.0 
Oil price *OPε  0.14 0.69; 0.0; 0.0; 0.0 
Oil output YOε  0.1  
Risk premium shock RPε  0.16  
Foreign risk premium RPFε  2.0  
Money growth shock µε  0.15  
Interest rate shock Rε  0.0015  
Money gap shock GMε  0.03  
 
Using the data on budget expenditures, the calculations show that the public investment 
expenditures comprises approximately 41% of government expenditures ( Gω ). Moreover, the 
efficiency of public investments ν  and the pace of government spending ι  are set to 0.1 and 
0.25 respectively. 
The parameters in the specifications of the monetary authority are considered  as free parameters 
and calibrated to demonstrate desirable dynamics in the model following an oil price shock.  
 
 
 
4. The Experiments 
We check the performance of the model by focusing on the impulse-response dynamics of the 
selected macroeconomic variables after an oil price shock under benchmark scenario and various 
policy mixes. 
 
4.1. Benchmark Simulation 
The response of the selected macroeconomic variables to an oil price shock is displayed through 
Figures 1-9 (see Appendix) under the benchmark scenario. It is assumed that 
• the oil fund transfers all incremental increase in oil revenues to the budget 
• monetary authority pursues a peg regime and intervenes FX market to absorb excess 
supply/demand  
Due to model specification, the effect of the oil price shock will propagate to the economy 
through its first round effect on the fiscal sector. The part of the increase in oil revenues resulted 
from a rise in oil prices is transferred to the government budget, hence pushing up the budget 
revenues. The second round effects of the oil price shock are induced by the expansion in 
government expenditures, namely public consumption and investment spending. The 
government consumption and investment expenditures boost the aggregate demand, however, 
beside its effect on the aggregate demand, public investment also augments public capital, hence 
enhancing total factor productivity (TFP) and aggregate supply. 
In all three specifications, the consumption expenditure of the household sector responds 
adequately and its behavior is consistent with ex-ante expectations. It is worth to note that the 
effect of the oil price shock is more robust on the consumption dynamics of the third 
specification. Because of the rise in consumption, the demand for imported consumption goods 
grows in all specifications, but this growth is more pronounced in the third specification. The 
private investment expenditures and imported investment goods also demonstrate similar 
behavior. 
The government expenditures and public investment spending also rise, but this increase is more 
evident in the case of the first specification. The jump in the public investment augments public 
capital and hence, enhances TFP. The rise in consumption, investment and government 
purchases leads to expansion in the production and consequently, the real non-oil GDP grows 
significantly despite the sizable increase in the demand for imported goods. The model 
demonstrates the effect of the fiscal impetus on the real non-oil economy due to the expansion in 
the oil production which stimulates fiscal spending, feeding back into the non-oil sector. 
The positive advances in the real economy creates upward pressure on the real wages of labor 
and marginal costs of the firms. The same behavior reveals itself in the dynamics of domestic 
prices which jumps more forcefully in the third specification. The response dynamics of the 
foreign prices is the reverse of the domestic prices, and similarly, falls more significantly in the 
case of third specification.    
We observe similar dynamics in the cases of money supply and the interest rate in all 
specifications.  In the first specification interest rate is imported from the external world through 
UIP condition under fixed exchange regime. In the second specification, it is assumed that the 
money demand adjusts instantaneously to the money supply. However, in the third specification 
the money supply deviates from the money demand in the short run because of the temporary 
disequilibrium assumption. 
Despite all these differences in the specification of the monetary authority, money supply 
exhibits similar responses and contracts in the first ten periods. However, it restores its previous 
levels and begins to expand after approximately twelve periods. Respectively, the interest rate 
shoots up in the beginning periods but enters into the negative zone in the later periods.4,5 In the 
third specification, money demand and money supply do not overlap in the short run and money 
gap becomes significant as money demand responds more strongly than money supply.6 
4 In the case of the third specification, because money demand responds to the oil price shock more strongly than 
money supply, the market interest rate rises. 
5 Except the first specification, we expected that in response to the increase in oil fund transfers to the budget, the 
monetary authority would intervene to the FX market to absorb excess supply of the foreign currency to relax the 
downward pressure on the exchange rate. This central bank transaction would cause expansion in the money supply 
as the authority lacked necessary instruments to sterilize its intervention.  
6 The comparatively weak response of the money supply might be tracked down to the substantial jump in the 
volume of the imported goods. However, even after improving and moderating the effect of the import on the money 
                                                 
4.2. Fiscal Policy Option 
The benchmark scenario assumes complete spending of the oil revenues as it accrues to the oil 
fund. It is also interesting to test a different fiscal spending rule, namely, expenditure smoothing 
rule (using Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH)) followed by the fiscal authority (see Figures 
10-19 in Appendix). 
Under the PIH spending rule, the real macroeconomic variables of interest in the second 
specification demonstrate stronger responses to the oil price shock. Namely, the consumption, 
investment expenditures and physical capital stock of the household sector jump more 
significantly in the second specification. However, in most of the cases the response dynamics of 
the respective variables in the first and the third specifications are similar.  
The oil fund transfers to the government budget based on the fiscal policy rule (PIH) rise more 
sharply in the second specification and hence, the government expenditures. Consequently, the 
non-oil GDP rise substantially in the second specification, but falls and approaches to zero after 
a short time. 
The import prices fall, but domestic prices rise more steeply in the second specification. The CPI 
spikes upwards in the beginning years but then enters a downturn and approaches to zero in later 
periods. As in the case of real variables, price dynamics of the first and the third specifications 
are similar and very close to zero.  
 
4.3. Monetary Policy Option 
Under the benchmark scenario, the monetary authority maintains a fixed regime and intervenes 
FX market to absorb excess supply/demand of foreign currency from the market. We will also 
test the performance of the model under more flexible exchange rate regime (see Figures 20-33 
in Appendix). 
In the case of a more flexible exchange regime, the macroeconomic variables exhibit even much 
richer dynamics. When compared to the fiscal policy rule simulation, the response dynamics of 
the almost all macroeconomic variables of interest are different in all three specifications. The 
consumption expenditures, import of the consumer goods and physical capital respond more 
forcefully in the third specification. However, the government and investment expenditures, 
import, oil fund transfers and non-oil GDP rise more significantly in the first specification. 
The import prices slump, but the domestic prices move upwards more sharply in the case of third 
specification. In the first periods, the consumer prices bounce up but after fiver periods it enters 
the negative zone. 
The exchange rate depreciates in all three specifications due to the exchange rate rule followed 
by the monetary authority. In the first periods, the depreciation is more evident in the case of the 
third specification, but the appreciation starts to take place after five periods and become more 
influential in the case of the second and the third specifications. 
 
supply which creates the required demand for the excess supply of the foreign currency in the FX market, the money 
supply "puzzle" still remains. 
                                                                                                                                                             
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we developed a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model for an oil 
rich country. Apart from the classical DSGE models where the model is generally closed using 
Taylor rule for countries maintaining flexible exchange regime or fixing exchange rate for 
countries pursuing a hard peg, we explicitly modeled the FX market and central bank 
intervention to the market. 
In most of the classical specifications, foreign exchange markets are generally ignored and the 
exchange rate is typically assumed to be determined by UIP condition, relating exchange rate 
expectations with interest rate differentials. We also followed the suit and built our first 
specification based on the classical assumptions.  
However, in the second and third specifications, we deviated from the classical assumptions and 
developed models to capture the main characteristics of FX markets in oil exporting countries. 
There, we dropped the UIP assumption and replaced it with an exchange rate rule followed by 
the central bank. Moreover, we also explicitly gave the detailed specification of the fiscal and 
monetary sectors. The mechanism of the spending of oil revenues through fiscal channel and its 
all-round feedback on the rest of the economy and growth were carefully outlined.   
The comparison of the response dynamics of main macroeconomic variables in those 
specifications reveal interesting results. Most of the time, the responses of those variables to the 
shocks have the same direction, though different magnitudes. Namely, when we define a 
different spending policy rule for the fiscal authority or an exchange rule for the  monetary 
authority the model provide consistent results in all specifications. We find that all three 
specifications allow the fiscal authority to act as the main actor in propagating and amplifying 
the effects of the oil price shocks to the rest of the economy. 
For the benchmark simulation, the response dynamics of the most of the main macroeconomic 
variables are in line with ex-ante expectations. The most surprising response dynamics are 
observed in the cases of the money supply and the market interest rate after an oil price shock. 
However, despite significant differences all three specifications demonstrate strikingly similar 
response dynamics.  
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